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EEC AND US VIEWS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY:
MYTH AND REALITY
When Poul DaLsager, European Commissjoner for agricuLture, recentLy
addressed a joint meeting of representatives of business and farming in
the European Community and the US, he asked - rhetoricaLLy - whether anyone
couLd seriousLy support specious comparisons between European and American
poLicies on agriculture, suggesting that the US has Low farm prices fixed
{/4; St, t ro I )
by the market, Low expenditure on agricuLturaL support, modern farms and be-
Lieves in free trade, whereas the EEC has high prices fixed by the authorities,
a high LeveL of pubL'ic expenditure, backward farmers and beLieves in inter-
ventionism. These are simpLy sLogans for domest'ic consumption, he said,
none of these matters can be viewed in bLack and white terms. (1)
ApparentLy, some peopLe do stiLL take this bLack-and-white view of the
EECrs common agricuLturaL poLicy. This note sets out to refute some of
the more w'ide-spread myths about the CAP - that the CAP i s unique Ly protec-
tionist, that pubLic expendjture on agricuLture in the EEC is greater than
in the US, that the growth in EEC farm exports is responsibLe for the
troubLes of American agricuLture, or that the CAP (incLuding the system of
export refunds) are somehow contrary to the GATT ruLes. To compLete the
picture, there 'is an append'ix Listing the spec'ific compLaints .invoLving the
EEC currentLy being examined by the GATT (incLuding two complaints brought
against the US by the EEC) and summaris'ing the Commun'ity position.
(1) EC-US trade reLat'ions in the agricuLturaL fieLd - Time to g'ive up the
poLicy of passing the buck: Summary of speech by Mr. DaLsager to the
uS chamber of commerce and c0PA in Frankfurt on 5 October 1982
rP (82)?45.
11. The CAP is uniquel y protect i on'i st
ALL the industriatised nat'ions pr^otect thei r agnicutture. This is because
of the enormous poL'it'icaL, econom'ic and sociaL importance governments attach
to the goaLs of seLf-suffic'iency, food security, price stabiLity and main-
ta'ining the incomes of their farmers and the ruraL popuLation generaLLy.
The inherent instabj Lity of agricuLturaL markets , refLecting lieasonaL varia*
tions in output, is another reason why governments have aLways applied speciaL
ruLes to trade'in agricuLturaL products.
Because of the repeated pubLic attacks on the cAp from such countries as the
US and AustnaLia, it is sometimes assumed that the EEC must be particuLarLyprotectionist' This beLief is hardLy grounded on fact. onLy cereaLs, rice,
sugar, oLive oiL, dairy products and beef benefit from the fuLL system of
variabLe import Levies to offset the difference between.internaL EEC and
generaLLy Lower u,orLd prices. ALL other products benefit from a ret.ativeLy
modest degree of tariff protection and are subject within Limits to a
considerabIe degree of competition fnom imports. Even for those pro<Jucts
subject to import levies, speciaL arrangements have been made to aLLow conti-
nu'ing imports of butter (from New ZeaLand), sugar (from the ACp) and beef (ACpand
traditionaL GATT suppL'iers), though this does not of course excLude other
'i nterventi on measures.
In practice, aLmost aLL other tiest European countrjes either because of ihe
need to keep peopLe on the Land in m^rrntainous or per.ipheraL regions, or
because of the poLiticaL'importance attached to seLf-suffic.iency, have more
restrictive import pol-icies and frequentl.y higher.internaL prices than theEEc' It is weLL known that Japan, in spite of being one of the three Leadingindustriat powers, rigorousLy pnotects its numerous smaLL farmers against
competition from more efficient overseas suppLiers,'incLuding US and European
producers
As negards the united States, it is worth re-caLLing that the US has had since
1955 the benefit of a waiver from the rules of GATT for a series of agri-
cuLturaL products incLuding dairy produce, sugan, cotton and peanuts" This
aLLows the US, among other things, to impose whatever import restr ict.ions it L.ikes
in order to ensure the effectiveness of internal price support rneasures. The current farm support LegisLatimprovides foli ntervention measures to support prices f or mi Lk, wooL, wheat,
mai ze, soya beans, r'i ce, sugan, cotton and peanuts. Furthermore, uS pr.i cesfor beef, sugar and dairy procJuce, which are kept up by restrictive import
poLi c'ies , are comparabLe to those in the EEc - indee<j, support pri ces fordairy produce have risen faster s'ince 1973 in the us than in the EEC,
with the resuLt that the US how has a bigger surpLus d.isposaL probLem in the
dai ry sector than the Eunopean commun.ity. In other words, the us .itse Lf
2does not hesitate to support prices by'intervention measures or import restric-
tions whenever this is feLt to be desirabLe. In these circumstances, it is
arbitrary and inconsistent for US officiaLs to criticiseEEC agricuLturaI pro-
tecti oni sm.
Last but by no means Least, this picture of EEC protectionism.is hard to re-
conc'iLe with the trade figures. The Community remains the wor[d,s Largest
'importer of food and agricuLtunaL products with 24% of aLL imponts. The US
takes onLy 1O% of wor[d imponts while accounting for 177, of aLL exports. The
EECrs share of worLd exports is onty 11%.Furthermore, the US has a Large and
growing export surpLus'in agn'icuLturaL trade with the Community, which rose
from $ 1.7 biLLion in 1971 to $ 6.8 biLLion in 1981. As welL as being the
b'iggest customer for American fanmers, the EEC is aLso by far the Largest
market fon agricuLturaL commodities from the deveLoping countries, with imports
worth $ 27 bi LL'ion in 1979 corresponding tc 301Z of the LDC's agr.icuLturaL ex-
ports- The Community imports approx'imateLy $ 100 worth of agricuLturaL pro-
ducts from the LDC's per head, approximateLy twice the corresponding figure
for the US ($ 49) or Japan ($ 56).
32. The EEC qives massive subsidies to enabLe its inefficient farmens to compete
against more efficient overseas suppLier"s.
ALL governments subsidize their farmers for the reasons given above. In fact,
the EEC agricuLtunaL subsidies are proport'ionateLy no higher than those in other
industriaLised countries incLuding the US. l.Jhi le the CAP is certainLy desi-
gned to protect the incomes of the farm popuLation (art'icLe 39 of the EEC
Treaty), it has activeLy promoted structuraL change to make European farming
more efficient and more competitive.
It is sometimes claimed in the US that the cost of farm support in the EEC is
4A% higher than that provided by the American government to its fanmers. In
1980, totaL budget expend'iture on agricuLture in the European Community, 'incLu-
d'ing nationaL expend'iture by member States, came to $ 37.6 bi LLion as opposed
to $ 24.5 b'i L L'ion spent by the US Federa L Government f or the same purpose
a figure which does not take account of agricuLturaL expenditure by the indi-
viduaL states. However, tak'ing'into account that the active popuLation
in the agricuLturaL sectorin the US (3.3 mi LL.ion) is Less than haLf that
in the EEC (7.8 miLLion), totaL budget expenditure per person employed was
stiLL cons'iderabLy higher in the US than in the EEC ($ 7,330 versus $ 41780).
If you compare budget spending on agriculture with the vaLue added of the
agricuLturaL sector - the criterion used by 0ECD to measure agricuLturaL budget
support - you wiLL find that over the three-year period 1976-78 the ratio
was 39.27. in the EEC and 37.6t in the US (excLud'ing expenditure by the States).
It is hard to avoid the concLusion that farm spending in the EEC is of the sarne
order of magnitude as in the US.
SimiLarLy, the accusation sometimes made'in the US that EEC expenditure is
designed to keep ineffic'ient'farmers jn business, does not stand up to
examination. Over the per"iod from 1968 to 1979, the number of peopLe employed
in agriculture in the EEC felt by more than 4 miLL'ion on more than a third,
whiLe the US farm popuLation remainedvirtuaLLy unchanged. Since the EEC
was set up at the end of the 1950's, the EEC Community farm population has
mone than haLved f rom 17 mi LLion to Less than 8 m'i LL'ion. This f aLL in the
number of peopLe empLoyed in agricuLture has been accompanied by an increase
in the size of holdings and by.improved production methods and yieLds. This
has Led to a continuing jncrease in pnoduct'ivity, which has'in turn had a
cons'iderabLe'impact on the EEC's agr"icuLturaL seLf-suffic'iency.
The Community has formaLLy recoglnized that the increased effic'iency of European
farmers must Lead to changes .in the CAP. For a wide range of commod'ities, incLu-
ding cereaLs, sugar and dairy produce, the Community has now introduced the ruLe
that if product'ion exceecjs a cer^ta'in LeveL (the so-caLLed guarantee threshoLd)which
takes account of dcmestic and internaticnaL demand, EEC farmers rnust expect either
to see their guaranteed prices reduced, or to bear the cost of d'isposing of
the excess production.
43. The EEC has expanded i !:_,ill exports at the expense of othen suppLiers , parti cu-
LarLy the US.
Not so.
True, EEC agricuLturaL exports have grown substantiaLLy over the past decade, but
thi s has taken pLace aga'inst the background of rap'idLy expanding worLd markets.
Furthermone, US exports have grouJn even faster. Thus, whiLe worLd agnicuLturaL
trade increased between 1971 and 1980 by 451%, the EEC increased its agricuLtural
exports during the same period by 513%, but the US increasecl itsagricuLturaL saLes
by as much as 5367.. These figures do not indicate any dispLacement of traditionaL
US exports by competition from the EEC (the question of export subsidies is
deaLt with in the next section).
This concLusion is borne out by an examination of the growth in EEC agricuLturaL
exports- This has been concentrated in five main sectors - cereaLs, sugar, beef,
dairy produceand aLcohoLic beverages. But the onLy sector.in which the US is
a major exporter whose'interests couLd be affected by EEC competition.is cereaLs.
However, the growth of EEC epxorts of cereals has not Led to the Cornnnity increas.irg its market
share - which remains constant at about 5% of the worLd cereaLs market - because
of the paraLlet growth in US exports.
Thus, EEC exports of wheat (incLuding wheat fLour ) doubled between 1969/10 and
1980/81 to 14 m'i L Lion tonnes, but US exports more than doubLed over. the
same perjod from 16.5 miLLion tonnes to 41.9 miLLion tonnes, EEC exports in fact
increased Less fast than the worLd market, with the resuLt that the EEC share
feLL from 16.6% to 14.9y., whiLe the uS market share rose from 3g.4% to
44-B'A in the same period. These figures hardLy confirm the existence of a
threat to US wheat saLes from EEC "subsidized" exports, espec.iatLysince EEC
export refunds do no more than enabLe European exporters to aLign on the worLd
price, which is detenmined by US market conditions.
In fact, the biggest probLem for US farmers has been the drop'in prices for
corn and soya beans. Here the EEC is not a competitor but the biggest market
for US exports with saLes of 9.9 mi LL'ion tonnes of corn, 11.8 mi LL.ion tonnes
of soya beans and 7.2 miLLion tonnes of soya cakes in 19g0
Seen from the European side, it is hard to escape the concLusion that the US
is trying to export its probLems, by making the European Community into the
scapegoat for the difficuLties of American farmers. But the faLL.in US
commod'ity prices is not due to EEC subsidized exports. As the US Secreta ry of
AgricuLture said in Osaka on 13 Septemberr,,Lower commod.ity prices, both
at the fanm and export terminaLs, are a resuLt of Lar"ge US and gLobaL sup-
plies, a stagnant economic performance wonLdw'ide, the increased reaL cost
of borrow'i ng and the stronger doLLar,,.
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Those who see "subsidized" exports from the EEC as getting.in the way of US
agricuLturaL saLes, shouLd remember that US agricuLturaL poL'icy can aLso d.isrupt
EEC markets. Thus, high guaranteed prices for sugar have resuLted.in the
growing use of corn sweeteners, Leading to a contraction in US imports and hence
in the worLd market to the detriment of sugar producers such as the EEC (1).
Funthermone, the expLosive growth'in us exports of corn gLuten feed, a by-
oroduct of conn sweeteners and ethanol has upset the batance of the EEC cereaLs
market (1). Last but not Least, there is the possibLe disposaL of surpLus US
stocks of butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder on the world market, at the
expense of the EEC and New Zeatand.
(1) The EEC has soright consuLtations in GATT on US import quotas for sugar
and exports of corn gLuten feed (see appendix).
4. The CAP is contrary to the ruLes of GATT
AbsoluteLy untrue- rhe EEC has aLways respected GATT ruLes, wh.ich is more than
be said for some of the Commun.ity's critics.
Let's take import restrictions first
hlhen the CAP was set up in the early 1960's, the EEC negotiated the necessary
adjustments to its externaL tariff in GATT. It d'id the same after 1973 when
Britain joined the Community. In other words, the other Contracting partners
were fuLLy compensated for the introduction of the CAp.
US criticism of the cAP is panticuLarLy ironic given the fact that since 1955
the uS, unIike the EC, has benefitted from a spec'iaL GATT waiven that aLLows
it to ignore certain GATT ruLes on agricuLturaL trade. Under this waiver the
us is free to'impose whatever.impont restrictions it Likes on commodities benefit-
t'ing from an internaL support programme Li ke cottonrsugarrpeanuts and dai ry
pnoducts. Since a waiver is in principLe a temporary nieasure (s.ince 1 955...),
the US has never had to compensate the other Contracting parties whose in-
terests were affected.
The EEC is sometimes accused of pLanning uniLateraL moves to cut back imponts
of corn gLuten feed, thereby vioLating uS GATT rights. This accusat.ion is
aLso unfounded.
The EEC has mereIy sought bi Lateral consuLtat'ions to discuss the possibi L.ity
of haLting the growth of imponts of corn gLuten feed from the US. From the
uS s'ide, we sometimes hear that uS right of access to the community market is
"non-negotiabLe"- But GATT gives any contracting party the right to w.ithdraw
a trade concession in return for adequate compensation. So far, the EEC
has made no moveto exercjse that rightrprefenring to continue biLateraL
consuLtations, but 'if the commun'ity does ever decide to mod.if y the present
'impont arrangements, the questionof compensation wiLL have to be settLed - but under
GATT procedures the US cannot refuse to negotiate.
In fact, most US criticism focuses on EEC exportg to Th.ird Country markets
oarticularLy where these benefit from export refunds, the impLication being
that where "subsidized" agricuLturaL products from the EEC compete with
"unsubsidized" exports from the US, this is somehow contrary to GATT trad.ing
ruLes.
Th i s 'i s si mp Ly unt rue. Art'i c Le XVI of the GATT Lays down that export subs i d.ies
for primary commodities are permitted provided that they do not tead to any
contracting Party taking more than an equitabLe shane of worLd markets. After
Long and difficult negotiat'ions in the Tokyo Round, agreement was reached in
1979 on a Subsidies code wh'ich conf irmed this ruLe whi Le laying down cLearer.
procedures and criter ia for examjning aLLeged breaches. The [egitimac vof
the EEC system of expor t refunds on aq ri cu Ltura L products cannot be caLLed
into questjon , and was indeed formaLLy recognized by the chief uS trade nego-
tiator in the Tokyo Round.
/ It 'is hard to reconci Le the current Ameri c ign to eLiminate
7.
EEC export refunds
on aqricuLturaL products with the ag reement reached by the Communit y and the US on
th i s quest'ion in the Tokyo Round.
The GATT has never yet ruLed in a specific case that EEC export refunds have been
used to take an unfair share of worLd markets. For example, the paneL set up to
examine the Austratia/BraziL compLaints against the EEC sugar poticy in 1978,
stated that aLthough the EEC had increased-its share of the worLd market, it was
unab[e to concLude that this had resuLted jn the community hav..ng more than an
equitab[e share of vorld export trade in sugar in terms of ArticLe XVr.
As regards the various uS compLaints in GATT that the EEC has tak3n more than a
fair share of worLd markets or otherwise faiLed to respect its obLigat.ions, the us
sees these cases not as a means of correcting aLLeged unfair competition
in part'icuLar cases, but as a means of obtaining changes in the CAp, which
would aLlow the uS to expand its own exports. (1) The us has made
cLear that it expects the EEC to change'its poLicies if the GATT panels find that
the EEC is in the wnong. By contrast, if the 6ATT faiLs to uphold the US position.
US off ic'iaLs have stated they wi Ll seek to change the ruLes, i.e. renegot'iate the
Subsidy Code. Th'is is what is known as : ,,heads I win, tai Ls you Lose". 0ther
offic'iaLs have impLied that the US wiLL have recourse to compet'it'ive export
subsidies aimed at the EEC, which amounts to saying that if the GATT faiLs to con-
demn EEC export refunds as contrary to the Subs'idies Code, rhen the US itseLf
wiLL adopt the kind of aggressive export poLicy the EEC is accused of practising.
This attitude has been described by the Cornmission as a strange interpretation
of the ruLes of international trade and a very dangerous poLicy (z).
As far as the Commun'ity is concerned, there can be no question of renegotiating
the international trade ruLes with respect to agricuLture in generat, and the
system of export refunds in part'icuLar, so soon after the end of the Tokyo Round,
when a baLanced agneement was finaLLy reached after Long and d'ifficuLt negotiations.
What is more, it 'is arb'itrary and i LLogicaL to criticise the EEC use of export
refunds without examin'ing the methods used by other Contracting Parties to promote
their exports incLuding US concessionaL saLes under PL 48O, "bLended credits"
and other fonms of interest rate subsidy, as u/eLL as the',Export Boards,,by
which the traditionaL agricuLtural producers support their r:xport trade.
(1) See anal-ysis of current GATT compLaints invoLving the EEC jn the appendix
to this note.
(2) See speech by Mr. Dalsager to the joint meeting of the US Chambers of
Commerce and C0PA in Frankfurt on 5 0ctober 1982.
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I. The US complaint is based primarily on the Subsidies Code agreedllirring the Tokyo Round. It is atleged in particular ttrat t.he iia irad
used export subsidies Lo take more than its fair share of world export
markets at the expense of US exporters and to undercut US priees. In
the seconcl pIace, the'US has challenged ttre Iegatit.y of export subsidies
on flour on the grounds that it is not a primary product and that,
cot'rsjequently. all forms of export subsidy are prohibited.
3- The EEC as replied as follows :
The f igurt'.:' do not show any displ ace'nent of uS exports l'y
"subsiaizedttEtC sales during the preceding 1 years, vrhich is the
ref erence period inclicated in the Code ( tne US comPl,ai nt is based
on figures gcing back to the 1950's before the eAP was in full
operrIion). Anfway, the iJS figures are.distorted by the substantial
volume nf. c.rncessional saieo oi the PL 480 typu (2/3 of aI1 sales) .
Closer. e Xi,ili ,rration teveai,:: ilc ciiSP where tJS eXporters ltave been
undercut by Ltil flour sold rvith the hrenefit of export refunds. These
refunds, whji:lr are paicl in orrJer i-o off'set the higher cost of ttC
Cer.eals hy i:{}iir rlarison l-o world c:rea}s prieesr aPe ca}culated very
strictly. The Commrrnity fiour miLIing industry is highly efficient
and internationally competitive, as illustrate'J by the trade in flour'
f rom wheat imported under tne i,tive rc - processinq reqime and
reexported withouL. 8nY refurnd.
The qua)-itative difference bretween tiC and US flour has led t-o a
de f act.o sDecial- isation, which also corresponds to t.he bread-makinq
techniquesi ancl (lietary habits oi the imlorting countries, all of
which virtuaily preo Iucl:s any comparison betweer, EtC and US markets
and prir.es.
FIour ha:: a-irraYS been
consequenL -)I l, i -.E, b l- e
interptet-"tir:rr cf the
t. The p ane I lj :,li u
by tne encTTnd i ngs
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classifi ed
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u.s gompraint alreges that subsidized exports of poul try by thetaken more than an equitable share of world maricets and haveus p rices, thereby damaging the interest of us producers.
4 I!" fEC replies that EEC sales have in no way displacerJ iJS.exports.The US has its traditional markets in America and the Far East,
while the EEC has traditionally been the dominant supirl ier of In" restof Europe, Africa and the l'liddle fast. ThoLigh totaf. tiC exports have ris.rnmarginally faster thah US sales (l ), this geographical patlern has notchanged signifieantly since the enrJ of the iokyo houn.J, except y-rat trreus has been increasing its exports to the t,liddle East.
1. TheEc have
undercut
In the
come from
the inarket
1982, the
subsidies
-3. The US indicatedthe complaint against
subsidies on US sales
Middre East, however, the most aggressive competition hasBrazil, which entered the market in r975 and now has 35yo:F
as against 53% f or the EEC and 6,^ for the US (Z). In JuIyUS decided to investigate Brazilian productr'.on and export
on poultry and to seek consul tations with that country.
in July L9Bz that it would not proceed further rri!-irthe EEC until the effect of Brazilian exporthas been established.
(1 ) EEC sales of poultry increased from I9l,0c0 tonnes in455,000 tonnes in 1981, while us exports rose in il'refrom 1 94, 000 t onnes to I 91, 000 t onnes .
(2) us f igures.
1978 to
same period
3Pasta
1. The US has challenged the legality of such refr:nds for pasta under
Article 9 of the Subsidies Code, which lays down that export subsidies
may only be granted on primary conmodities. The IJS argrles t-iral pasta
cannot be considered a pr imary produc t.
2. The EEC replies that it only grants export refunds on prirnary?dmmodities (".g. durum wheat or otfrer cereals), incorporated inprocessed products such as pasta, the refund being designed to offsetthe diflf erence between EEC and world prices f or the com*odi ty concer.nerj
and not to subsidize the processing industry concerned.
There is no case for saying that EEC exports have injrrred iJSproducers. EtC exports to the US (gSX of which come from Italy), wenl:
up from 15,0C0 tonnes in 1977 to 27,000 tonnes in 1980, i.e. from 0.7 to
1.1,'6 of US production. Total imports remained constant at J% of US
domestie consumption.
The US complaint is consequently to be viewed as an attempt to
obtain endorsement of a new interpretation of Article 9 of the Subsidies
Code, which would force the fEC to abolish export relu;rds on all
processed agricultural products, even ifl the refund relates soIeIy to
the primary produc t content.
3. The
meet].ng
panel held its first meeting in July 19B'2, and its second
in 0ctober.
I
Tinned fruit and raisins
1' The US has complirirted about i:i:C proDessing aiurs flor ti rrre:l p,-,a_-i-r.r.,';
-pGa'rs, nixed fruit and raisjrts. Tirey cLain t.hat the p,.,),)essirrg ai,ls f.rrtinned pears and peat:ites, iltrodu--aJ hy t-he tEI in L9]8, are r ir.r]iy t-.ostimulate EED prodtlction and hence rerluce imports, thirs i;-npaining ttr,:trade benefit they were enl-it199 !o expect as a result- ofl thr: ifr-- i_aniFfeoncessions on their products (C,1fT binding). As regards the aid Forraisins, which was introduced ir-r 19BI on tlie accession of Grrlrl.,,)r it isclaimed that thi-s represents a threat to u5 exports which benefit fc,),n atariff bindinq.
2. As regards tinned peaches and pear:1 , the Commissi on has repl ied
4
that the aids were introduced in order to t-relp row incomeparticularly in the Medi terranean rrrgions of the EEC. Thepaid to processors who in return rr"i pay a minimum priceproducers and have been fixed at a reasonable lever.
prodrJCBfsr
aids are
to the
halved in(1), anrl
sul tanas
- The trade figures do not substantiate the alleqerJ damage to Usinterests' As regards tinned pears, total impJrts have been stableat abouL 45.000 tonnes a year since tgjZ (f gg1 irnports = lZ.50ttonnes). US exports to a1I destinatiorrs have been fallinq, whilesales to EEC have been rimited and irregurarr VOrying from c to3% of the market.
As regards t inned peaches, US imports have been fluc tuat inqround an average of about r0.000 tonnes a year. rgBi saleswere 9'600 tonnes representing 13% of the fgc market as opposeilto 9.5o0 tonnes in r977 and g.oo0 tonnes in r976.
As regards raisins (ariea grapes) the commissi.on argues t.hat
- from the legar point of view, the Greek tarifF on raisins was notbound in GATT, and that Article XXIV (d) n"gotiaiion" to regularisethe tariff situation following Greek accession are noL yetcompl eted.
- 
The competiti-ve position of Greek raisins on the EEC marketvis-a-vis imports has not been changed as a result of Greekaccession' Greek exports alreacly benefited from tariff-free ec:essto the EEC marl<et under th'e 196l A"=o"iation Agreement. The systenof processing aids introrJuced by the ttc in Lq6l is morlelled on thepre-existing Greek scheme, the only change beinq in"t the budgetaryburden has been transferred from G""u"u to the commtrnity.
Greek exports of19BI as result of
so cannot be held
to the Community.
sultanas to t-he rest of the IEC actuallyprice-undercutting by Turkish exporters
responsible for the faIl in US sales of
(1) 60,000 tonnes out
in 1981 were soLd
a minimum import
of the 1982 crop,
of totaL Greek production of 95,000 Lonnes of suLtanasto intervention. In 0ctober 19BZ the EEC introducedprice of $ 1,000 per tonne, in order to avoid a repetit.ionbut this w'iLL not affect imports from the uS and AustraLia-
5After reaching 10.000 tonnes in 1980, US exports fell to ll' 000
Ionnu" in r9Bl, but this figure wab still werl above the aver']!e
level of exports to the EEC for the previous three years
il;;i-iB-79') which were just over 9.000 tonnes. The competitivity
of us surtanas in 19Bl and LgBz has been adversely af Fected hy the
strong doIIar, which has Priced them out of all but the upper
end of the market.
\^li th respect to both tinned f ruit anrJ raisins, bhe proceedinqs irave
failed to establish material preiudice to us exporters' Neverthelesr;'
the us c Iaims that subsidies of Lt,iu kincJ to domestic producers, !R"o
facto, eliminate foreign producers' price advantage and aIe ti-rer:efore to
be regarded as impairiiq tn" trade lleneFits to be exp-'rcted From L'ra
relevant tariif bindinq. If this thesis \^ras accepted r anY f orm cl
production aid, incl,rding deficiency payrnentsr ofl products hott'td in GqTl'
could be challenged in the GATT. This would be a compLeteLy new departure.
6The EEC has granted tariff pre
countries with which it has concl
agreements (Spain, Turkey, CyprusEgypt, Jordan, Lebanon and IsraeI
and the US about the Community's
agreement was reached in Hay 1973
agreement) under which the EEC agpreferential agreements beyond th
seek reverse preferences from the
return, the US undertook not to c
agreements concluded by the EEC i
rences to a series of l,leditt:rranean
ed association or preferential tradeMalta, Algeria, Morocco, Trrnisia,
-Fo Ilowing a dispute between the l_ECeferential policy, a gentlemen'sthe so-calied Soames 
- Casr-y
ed not to c0nclude further
e :rlready established, ancJ not Lo
evelopinq countries (--oncernedl inlJ,errge the preferential tariffthe GATT.
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In November 1975, the American citrus prodrrcers tabled a compl ai rrtunder section l0l of the us Trade Act. The us sorght informalconsul tations wi th the Community on tt're brasis ofl tie Soames-Caseyynderstanding and then forrnal consultations in GATT, which were held in0ctober 1980, both without any result. In Deeember lgBl t-ire R"rqnnAdministration informed the commission that ifl ilre EEC did not 
"q"ue tonegotiate a reduction i n its tariff on citrus, the US would invoke GATr.
l. The us complaint arreqes that the EEC tariff lrreferencesJ-ruit violate the most favoured nation (non-ctiscrinrination)
GATT r BDd have damaqed US i nterests.
?. The EEC argues in reply that
on citrus
clause of
parties
Further-
f or developi nL1
poIitically, this amounts to a unilriteral move to cal I into questiona past aqreernent, i.e. the Soames-Casey understanding, which the EECon its side has aIways res[]rlcted, even if il, has no iug*1. r;tandinSin GATT
notiflierl al I its ;lreFer.erttial agreenr;nt.s
which allows contracting parties to set upgarea. The examinatir,rn of these agreementslong since conclurl ed.
Neither the community nor the other GATT contractingconcerned are prepared to'reopen those negotiati.ons.more, GATT 
=pecifically alrows preferential treatmenLcountries in derogation from the MFN clause.
Economically, the vol-ume of trade is modesL, and there is no r_.vi,Jenceof preiudice to us exporters as a result of tIc tarilf preleraocB:].
Iot3l-!5 exports to the Etc of orangesr grapefruit and l-ernons amountto $ zo mi11ion, ie. less than l% oi totat us agricultural sales tothe community. 0'ver the four yeirrs 1978 to l9Bi, US citrus exportshave remained f airly constant 
"t just unde r 5% oi' total EEC i.mports,with the Mediterranean countries lrpplyinq a f,airly constant Bili.Italian sales to the rest of the commurit-y rravr: .u",, cJecr j nedslightly f rom 8,"; to 7% of imports. The strength of the dollar andhiqh freiqht charq;es explain why tJS citrus ,,,xporters trave .Ciffj.,:u1tyin competing on the EEC market *itn Mediterrilnean suppl ier:s whoaccount f or more than hal f o f EIC consumpt j,on .
l. Bilateral consultationsdecided in November LgBZ to
held in ApriI 1982. The GAIf rlouncil
rJp a panel- to exam,tne il-re US complaint.
we re
set
(1) rhe us
certain has also used !hi" provision, for example, in favour of,Caribbean countries'.
7I/ Sugar
-fD
1. The tlS has invol<r,:rl tlr,: ;\rrL.i-Stthsirl ir;s [lorie ;rgainsl tire ].trnrliityu.
TE is alleged that I-{-0 export lr:funds an9 rr):-ilrorrr;ibl.r: for rJepressing
world markeL prices and consjequrlrrl.l.y domest-ii: US prices to the rJetrir,rerrl-
of US producers. The EEC rejects the alleqation that it- is resp,rnsiblt-,
for depressed world prices, rvhich also adversely affect the interc,sts of
Community producers, since they bear the financial rrost of exporting on
the world market. The Commr:niLy has prcposed a filrlttilaLeral sturiy af
all the factors affecting the ievel of prices.
Since the initial corrsultations in February 1982, thr:re has been nLi
further move by the Ll5, e.g. t-o set up a panel .
2. Subsequently, the EEC invoked ArLicie XXII to asi< For consult-atio;r,;
with the US over the latterrs import quotar; arrrJ l;rxes on sugar. Ihe i.lc
also argLres that the US system of tax rebates on export-ed sugar i:;
equivalent to an export subsidy. The iirst consul tat-j ons were t-rel:l in
0ctober 1982.
3. In L978, Australia and Brazil Iaunched a complaint against Lhi: I-[l's
ffiqar policy. The panel set up to exarnine tlris complaint fortnd thal-
although tEC exports had increased their share of t-he wo r1d market, i t
was unable to conclude that the ttC had taken more tt-rarr an equitahl e
share of wo rld markets at the expense of other exportels. it aCded that
EEC export subsidies rnight have contributed to depress lirices, but was
unable to isolate the impact of tEC exporL policy Firrrn ot-her far:t,rrs
tendinq to depress t.l-re wo rld rnarl<et.
Subsequent multilateral consultations between Lhe part-ies about the
folIow-up to the panel's ruling were inconclusj.ve, Austral-j-a and Brazi'l
insi.sted on concentratinq exclusively on IEC export:;rrbsjrlies. The
Community, in addition to pointing out that jt had introdr.;ced a modified
sugar policy in July i9Bl, insisteC that other countriesrsugar policies
should also be exarnined.
In April !982, Australia, Brazil anC eiqhL ot.her prr";rlucer count-r:ies,
mainly LDC's tabled a new complaint alti:irrst the fEC's suqar policy based
on the new Srlbsidies Code. A first lour.J of r,)onsul tat-iorrs w,ri; ir':ld
in September I982, The EEC maintajns that its expcrt reiirrrds arLr r-r,rt
subsidies, since the financial cost is supported lty the producers
thenselves, and that t.he IEC's suqar policy is not resl)orrsiL'rIe fon the
depressed state of the world ma rke t, lvh ich aflects the interests oflproducers in the Community as inuch as elsewherc. The Corrmunity
considers that it has done more tharr i.ts f:rir share to stabilize the
world market, e.g. by stockinq nearly 2 million tonnes of export.ablr-'
sugar in 19Bl/82, and that a solrrl-ion l-o the present depressed woi:Id
market can only [:e founcl thrclugh a concert.ed approach. No reqrrt;st For a
GATT panel has yeL beerr made, buL r:ont-acLr; are contilrrr iir! 5"t.r.,.-en tlr,:
EEC and the main producer coun Lries in the trS0 i n onder to iroor'linai:,:
moves to statrj1ize the worl.rl market. In the ionrl run, t-tre negotiation
of an improved ISA wi th the parti.cipation For a comprehen:;ive
defence of the EEC's sugar policy againsL the various orjt-ir.'isms
flormulated in GA l- i and elsewhere, siae l'1E|10 no 119.
,8
Corn gluten feed ( CCf )
In June 1982- the tEC sought consultations wi th the us r-lnder Ar t lcleXxI i (t ) of GATT on the groirnds that the niI tariff binding on thisproduct is causing a pfobrem for the cornmrrnity. As a result ofdevelopments in the productj.on oF is,:glucose arr,1 ;netharol, cf wirir:ir ,,-oL.rrgluten feed is a by-product, IE0 imports have i.i:]err fr,r,n 5g4rooo r_orrnesin I974 to 2r960,000 tonnes in 1980, almos;t entirely f rom the LJniteCStates. This trend can be expecteti to contirrrre. Corn gluten feecJ isone of a number of cereals substitutes irnported tnto th; Community inincreasing quantities over Lhe past few years and which have tenderJ to
replace higher-cost EIC cereals for use in animal fet-.,1 . Ihis in turnhas contributed to the development of iEC cereals exports to the worlrj
market. The Commission has frequently po inted to the contr;r,Ji.r:tionbetween US complaints at Ll-re Ceveloprnent of ttC exports oF cereals a-r,icereals-based products on the one hand, and !JS opposil:i.orr to any inovil tr;halt the explosive growth in exports of CGf to the EiC, on the other:hand.
The EEC has not proposed to r,rithcJraw the GATT binding on corn gIutel
..f eed, though it would be entitled to do so uncJer GAIT 
"itos (articl eXXVIII aIlows contracting parties to unbi.nd or renegctiatt-. tariff
concessions subject to appropr iate compensation. ) The Commissj.onproposal to the Council is for a temporary suspension of the binrlinrS,which would a11ovi the Communil-y to introduce a ni1 duty tariflf r;rrrrta oiI million tonnes' corresponding to tlr,r pres:rrt l-evef of inports. Thiswould ensure a tenporary stabilisatiorr of imports over the next fewyears until th9 proposed qradual rerluction i n t-he qap between cerealsprices in the EiC anrJ the main pror-Jrrcer couirtr:ie= p"oduces a betterbalance on the Comrnunity marl<e t ( I ) .
The first round oF consuLtations herd in 0c tober rgBZ wasinconclusive.
(1 ) The Communi ty has
manioc and brans,
decision has heen
p1 an ned.
already. taken measLl r(-rs to stabilise imports ofin addition to corn qlut"en feeci on whicl.r notaken. No other import stabilisat_ion measrrres are
